Russia's Starlink Ambitions

Russia has spent years developing Rassvet ("Dawn"), a low-Earth-orbit satellite internet network often dubbed the “Russian Starlink.” The BBC Russian Service examined whether Russia can build a viable alternative to Starlink, how the two systems differ, and what technical, financial, and political obstacles threaten Moscow’s ambitious plans.

In February 2026, SpaceX, acting at Ukraine’s request, disconnected Starlink terminals not registered on Ukrainian government-approved lists. The move disrupted Russian drone operations and frontline communications, highlighting Moscow’s dependence on the American network.

Russia launched its first batch of 16 Rassvet satellites on March 23, followed by another 16 on July 19. However, none had reached their planned 800-kilometer orbit by late September.

The project’s ambitious schedule calls for 156 satellites by the end of 2026, nearly 300 when operations are set to begin in 2027, and more than 900 by 2035. Meeting this year’s target would require launching another 124 satellites in three months — roughly eight Soyuz rocket missions. Notably, Russia conducted just 12 rocket launches in the first nine months of 2026.

Unlike SpaceX, which manufactures its own rockets and communications infrastructure, Rassvet’s developer, Bureau 1440, relies on state-owned manufacturers and launch facilities. Its satellites are launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the Far North.

The networks also differ technically. Starlink operates more than 11,000 satellites, mostly around 500 kilometers above Earth, and uses ground stations worldwide. Rassvet plans to operate at 800 kilometers, allowing fewer satellites to cover larger areas.

Unable to establish ground stations globally, Bureau 1440 relies more heavily on laser links between satellites, space analyst Georgy Trishkin told the BBC. Although more secure, these connections could slow data transmission.

Rassvet’s polar-oriented orbits are designed to cover Russia’s European territory and the Arctic, including the strategically important Northern Sea Route and military installations housing the Northern Fleet.

But deployment appears troubled. Independent satellite trackers show several spacecraft operating around 500 kilometers, with others even lower. Reports suggest Bureau 1440 might have to revise its orbital plans. One expert familiar with the project described the maneuvers as routine but acknowledged satellite losses. Lower orbits would reduce coverage per satellite, requiring additional spacecraft and launches.

Manufacturing delays already pushed the first deployment from late 2025 into 2026. Western sanctions further complicate access to advanced electronics. Although Bureau 1440 itself is not sanctioned, its parent company, IKS Holding, faces U.S. and Ukrainian restrictions. An industry source said the company obtains components through gray-market imports and Chinese suppliers, although at higher costs and with longer delivery times.

One of the broader problems facing Russia’s space industry is the dominant role of the state, which for decades restricted the development of private space companies. A 2015 reform transformed Roskosmos, the Russian space agency, into a state corporation responsible for both commissioning and carrying out space projects, further consolidating government control over the industry.

Roskosmos has also struggled to develop modern satellite communications systems. Its ambitious and costly Sfera ("Sphere") project included a satellite communications network called Skif ("Scythian"), which was frozen after Bureau 1440 began expanding its operations. Another system, Gonets ("Messenger"), remains operational but cannot provide the required data transmission speeds.

Against this backdrop, Bureau 1440’s rapid progress is unusual. An industry expert familiar with the company told BBC Russian that developing a satellite network in just five years, despite extensive bureaucracy, was a remarkable achievement.

But Bureau 1440 is not entirely independent of the government. Its parent company, IKS Holding, has ties to state agencies and security services. The group includes Tsitadel ("Citadel"), which developed equipment for Russia’s SORM surveillance system, used by authorities to intercept communications. Other companies in the holding supply technology for internet monitoring and censorship.

The company nevertheless plans civilian services. Agreements with Aeroflot and RZhD (Russian Railways) envision satellite connectivity aboard aircraft and trains by 2027-28. Testing on trains was announced in September.

Whether these ambitions are achievable remains uncertain. Bureau 1440 provides limited operational information, depends heavily on external suppliers, and relies on expendable rockets that are less economical than SpaceX’s reusable Falcon launchers. Yet the military stakes make abandoning Rassvet unlikely, with access to Starlink restricted and reliable battlefield connectivity essential to modern warfare.