Letters to the Editors

To the Editors:

I hesitate to point out what may be a simple typo in the otherwise awesome “Survival Russian” (July/August 2017), but I want to make sure that your Russian readers are aware that a good translation of Плевать мна на их сплетин could be “I couldn’t care less,” not “I could care less.”

This error is a common one, but “could care less” indicates some amount of care. If you ever catch yourself accidentally uttering “I could care less,” I recommend that you follow it up with a modifier: “I could care less -- but not much.”

Markell Raphaelson West
coauthor of forthcoming
Grammar, Schmammar
Via email

To the Editors:

I assume you caught the typo in the 1st line of p. 10 in the July/Aug. 2017 issue. The line should read: “... in Leo Delibes’s Coppelia.

Robert M. Weiss
via email

To the Editors:

In the 1917 Diary in the July/August issue, you wrote regarding the Kornilov Affair that it’s “not clear whether Kerensky was caught off guard or simply realized that Kornilov would not submissively fulfill his commands. The key to understanding this incident can be found in Kerensky’s own words: ‘I had no doubts as to the veracity of Lvov’s account.’”

He should have doubted. Vladimir Lvov, who is described by historian Sean McMeekin as an “aristocratic dilettante” and a patriot in his own mind, perpetrated a fraud on the Russian people. Lvov visited Kornilov right after the general had reached an understanding with Boris Savinkov. “What transpired next could be played for farce, were the consequences not so catastrophic,” McMeekin wrote in his just-published book The Russian Revolution. In short, Kornilov was told that Kerensky was offering him three options for dealing with the Bolsheviks. These were: 1) Kerensky as a dictator leading a new government; 2) an oligarchy of three or four rulers, including Kerensky and Kornilov, that would have unlimited power; 3) a military dictatorship under Kornilov.

Believing that Lvov was merely relaying the choices Kerensky was offering him, Kornilov picked No. 3, and in so doing, he “had just advocated, in effect, the overthrow of the Provisional Government, even if under entirely false pretenses.” On his return to Petrograd, Lvov never told Kerensky he had misrepresented the leadership. He simply reported Kornilov’s preference, which so shocked Kerensky that he asked Lvov to put the supposed demands in writing. McMeekin writes, “Here was written proof of Kornilov’s treasonous intentions, although it came from the pen of an (impostor), playing ventriloquist with the fate of millions.”

Finally, in a request for confirmation, Kerensky posed as Lvov, who was fatefully not present. Kornilov took the bait, and despite Savinkov’s attempt to talk Kerensky down, the government leader treated Kornilov’s affirmation as gospel. No one ever bothered to do due diligence into Lvov’s transmissions, and the misunderstandings he left in his wake would prove a priceless gift to Lenin.

David Edwards
via email