Security vs. Democracy

Will President Vladimir Putin introduce direct federal control over the Northern Caucasus region? Whether or not he does will have a bearing on the future structure of the government of the Russian Federation.

Over the past year, there have been significant changes in Russia’s system of government. Prior to events in the North Ossetian city of Beslan, the right of residents of the outlying regions of the Russian Federation to elect their own leadership was not doubted. However, after Chechen fighters seized a Beslan school in September 2004 and held more than 1300 people there for three days (317 hostages, including 186 children, died in the course of military efforts to free them; as of August 1, the death toll had reached 331), President Putin decided that citizens’ excessive political independence was contrary to the interests of national security. So, by December Putin had signed two laws granting him the right to directly appoint governors. Local legislatures must approve the presidential appointment, but half a year hence there has not yet been a single case of Putin’s appointee being rejected.

However, even such a significant curtailment of regional authority seemed insufficient to the Kremlin. Within Putin’s inner circle, a proposal is being drafted for the transfer of a number of Russia’s administrative divisions to direct central control. The first region where such a model might be tried is the Northern Caucasus, and the first high-ranking Russian official to voice the idea has been Putin’s envoy to the Southern Federal District, Dmitry Kozak, a man who enjoys the president’s complete confidence.

In 2000, 89 administrative subdivisions of the Russian Federation (which comprises 49 oblasts, 21 republics, 10 autonomous districts, six krais as well as two federal cities – Moscow and St. Petersburg – and one autonomous oblast) were divided among seven federal districts, which the President assigned his own people to head. But the Southern Federal District was always a special case, since it includes the most politically unstable and economically underdeveloped Northern Caucasian republics, such as Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetiya, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachayevo-Cherkesiya.

In the Republic of Chechnya, the “antiterrorist operation,” which is how Moscow refers to the military campaign against local separatists, has been going on for several years. But things are not calm in the other republics either. Last summer, large detachments of fighters seized Magas, the capital of Ingushetiya, and killed several dozen law enforcement officials. This summer, worrisome news is coming out of Dagestan, where there have been repeated attacks on police and government officials, as well as terrorist acts against the civilian population.

Dagestan was the subject of discussion at a meeting of the Commission for the Southern Federal District on July 18th, when Dmitry Kozak first mentioned plans to change the procedures for filling government posts in the Caucasus. In particular, the President’s envoy suggested limits on the political independence of regions not able to meet their own economic needs. “If an administrative subdivision of the Federation, whether for objective or subjective reasons, is not able to make money independently, then it should be put under direct federal control,” Kozak announced, adding that he had already prepared federal legislation that will be brought before the Duma at the start of its fall session. If Kozak’s proposals really are taken up in the Russian parliament, there is little doubt that they will be quickly enacted.

There is a certain logic to Kozak’s plans. Agriculture, which is particularly vulnerable in periods of political instability, has traditionally formed the foundation of all the economies of the Northern Caucasus. The collapse of the USSR, the disruption of longstanding trade and manufacturing ties, two wars in Chechnya, heightened tensions between ethnic groups and workforce migration into Russia have all contributed to the devastating economic and political crises in the Northern Caucasus. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the level of unemployment in these republics reached levels previously unseen in the Russian Federation. The tax base is not growing and the population lives in poverty.

As a result, Moscow has been forced to make up shortfalls in the budgets of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya and other republics – shortfalls of 90 percent or more. Meanwhile, regular subsidies from the Russian state budget have not improved the situation, but seem to have made matters worse, since they deprive local authorities of any incentive to develop political and economic independence. The political struggle in the Caucasus has long since turned into an armed struggle between local elites and tribal clans over the budgetary “feeding trough.”

Corruption, theft, tribalism, undemocratic approaches to governing, disdain for the law and elementary human rights – all of these phenomena (none of which are rarities in Russia) have reached particularly impressive levels in the Northern Caucasus, and the Kremlin has had to come to terms with this. It is no secret that, for many leaders in the Northern Caucasus (for instance, the de facto ruler of Chechnya, the Republic’s Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov), the funds from the federal budget are a sort of payment for “keeping things quiet.” It is no longer a case of Moscow helping poor Chechnya survive hard times, but of Chechnya demanding more and more money from Moscow, with the implicit threat that otherwise there will be a new round of political instability. And, while the Kremlin could, in principle, replace any regional leader it does not like, in the case of Chechnya, there is not really anyone else to choose from. Kadyrov is the most influential, pro-Moscow Chechen. And things are even worse in Dagestan, where there simply is no leader capable of being recognized by all the warring clans. In such a situation, an official from Moscow – especially someone from the military – appointed by Putin without the consent of the local legislature, would be better able to disburse budgetary funding that any of the “little tsars” of the Northern Caucasus.

On the other hand, this sort of approach is aimed at permanently diminishing the appeal of self-government for citizens of the Northern Caucasus. The Kremlin is aware that such plans are undemocratic, and for this reason the process of preparing Russian society to accept these changes began a month before Kozak’s July 18th appearance. With the help of journalists and Duma deputies close to the Kremlin, stories started to appear in the Russian press saying that Kozak had collected extensive data about the calamitous, literally catastrophic state of affairs in the Northern Caucasus. Over the course of a month – from mid-June to mid-July – the government-owned television stations featured regular broadcasts in which the head of the Southern Federal District said the same thing over and over in different ways. The Caucasus had been transformed into a “macro-region of instability,” one that local authorities were simply incapable of dealing with due to their corruption and ineffectiveness. The Kremlin, therefore, must take urgent emergency measures.

In parallel with this, the German magazine Der Spiegel learned that the Special Commission set up to look into the circumstances behind the terrorist attack in Beslan had concluded that, in order to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future, it would be necessary to expand the area of “antiterrorist operations” to encompass not just Chechnya, but all of the republics of the Northern Caucasus. The Commission’s conclusions have yet to be made public, and this information is unofficial. But, in the meantime, we have no way of knowing whether or not the Kremlin is preparing to use force if the residents of southern republics, unhappy with possible future infringements of their political rights, begin to protest with meetings and the takeover of administrative buildings, as has already happened in the Caucasus.

Most importantly, Kozak’s proposal, made in reference to Dagestan, could affect not only the Northern Caucasus, but other parts of the Russian Federation. After all, there are currently 27 regions of the country – in the Central European areas, in the Urals, in Western and Eastern Siberia, in the Far East – which are barely able to contribute 10 percent of their budget, and which are forced to accept subsidies from Moscow (although not all of their troubles stem from ineffective local government).

This is why the idea expressed by Kozak, but originating within Putin’s inner circle, over time threatens to “explode” the system of government established by Russia’s constitution. The Federation is built upon the essential principle of political equality of its constituent entities. But under Kozak’s plan regions would be divided not only into “rich” and “poor,” but into politically-independent and politically-dependent. And, in the end, that could lead to a collapse of the very foundation of democracy in contemporary Russian society.